Washington State Department of Transportation has published a Cascadia Ultra-High-Speed Ground Transportation (UHSGT) Project 2023 Legislative Update and has solicited comments. Following is my submitted comments on the report and the program.
The public has been led to believe that WSDOT has been planning Ultra High Speed Rail for the Vancouver BC – Portland corridor. The WSDOT web page “Ultra-High Speed Rail Study” and the Cascadia Ultra-High-Speed Ground Transportation (UHSGT) Project 2023 Legislative Update demonstrate otherwise.
The web page and the report state that WSDOT is developing a plan for planning. Thus far, $2.6 million has been expended on studies that have not yet resulted in a plan to develop a plan to build UHSR. There is another $3.4 million already budgeted for this project.
The website page states that the planning process that will develop a planning process is incomplete. This is reinforced by a statement in the Legislative Update “WSDOT and the Policy Committee submitted two U.S. federal grant applications to support project planning, totaling $198.1 million. If awarded, these grants will fund planning work over the next 2-5 years and allow for an informed decision about whether the UHSGT Project should proceed into further project development.”
This plainly indicates that not only is there no High Speed Rail planning, but that a decision on whether to begin High Speed Rail planning is two to five years and over $198 million away.
On July 23, Governor Inslee stated on ABC’s “This Week” program “The Earth is screaming at us” ““The fuse has been burning for decades and now the climate change bomb has gone off.” He further stated “We need to stop using fossil fuels. We do have the ability to restrain fossil fuels.”
The Governor’s statements reinforce several United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports over a period of more than a decade, stating that greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced by about 50 percent by 2030 to prevent irreparable climate damage.
However, climate change action by the state government has been ineffective.
RCW 70.45.020 (2008) requires greenhouse gas emissions reductions that have not been met. Greenhouse gas emissions have increased.
RCW 47.01.440 (2008) adopts a statewide vehicle miles traveled reduction goal of 18 percent by 2020.
(Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) in 2020 was only two percent less than in 2008.)
Executive Order 09-05 directs the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to:
(a)… and develop additional strategies to reduce emissions from the transportation sector.
(b)… develop and adopt regional transportation plans that will, when implemented, provide people with additional transportation alternatives and choices, reduce greenhouse gases, and achieve the statutory benchmarks to reduce annual per capita vehicle miles traveled in those counties with populations greater than 245,000.
RCW 47.04.280 (2021) states that It is the intent of the legislature to establish policy goals for the planning, operation, performance of, and investment in, the state’s transportation system. Public investments in transportation should support achievement of policy goals that include:
(a) Preservation: To maintain, preserve, and extend the life and utility of prior investments in transportation systems and services, including the state ferry system;
(b) Safety: To provide for and improve the safety and security of transportation customers and the transportation system;
(c) Stewardship: To continuously improve the quality, effectiveness, resilience, and efficiency of the transportation system;
(d) Mobility: To improve the predictable movement of goods and people throughout Washington state, including congestion relief and improved freight mobility;
(e) Economic vitality: To promote and develop transportation systems that stimulate, support, and enhance the movement of people and goods to ensure a prosperous economy; and
(f) Environment: To enhance Washington’s quality of life through transportation investments that promote energy conservation, enhance healthy communities, and protect the environment.
It requires that the powers, duties, and functions of state transportation agencies must be performed in a manner consistent with the policy goals set forth in subsection (1) of this section with preservation and safety being priorities.
The Legislative Update demonstrates that the Ultra High Speed Ground Transportation program fails regarding each of the above requirements as well as the Governor’s statements.
Specifically:
- Cost estimates for the WSDOT 2023 UHSR report to the legislature have not been updated since the 2018 UHSGT Final Report. The Joint Transportation Committee commissioned an independent review from RSG, the consultant, which indicates that the cost of the project will be up to double the original estimates from WSDOT.
Given the directive in RCW47.04.280 that updates to the legislature are to include policy recommendations that provide the most economical scenarios to the public, lack of any discussion of project costs is a gross omission. A costing methodology and discussion of escalating costs should have been included in the WSDOT report given recent inflation and workforce issues seen in all other projects at WSDOT.
- A timeline has not been identified for the UHSR project. The only reference with a timeline for the project is the 2018 WSDOT report. This report cites the system being operational by 2035, which is clearly not possible. Timeline estimates have not been directly or specifically updated in subsequent reports including the June 30th, 2023 report. The legislature and the public deserve to know that this type of project requires a time commitment of many decades, and that the system would probably not be operational until the 2050s as demonstrated by the California HSR project timeline.
- Given the lack of route selection, the report should be clear about the uncertainties regarding timeline and costs. The RSG report makes clear that without a route selection there is so much project uncertainty that it is impossible to provide the public and legislature a good understanding of what the project is and what the public will be getting for their investment, aside from more consultant reports. The public and legislature need to know the risks before making more investments.
- The report indicates that WSDOT is visualizing the planning for the UHSR system as part of the I-5 corridor development and makes very brief passing mention of Amtrak Cascades development. All other countries with robust rail systems have robust regional passenger rail. Development of our regional Amtrak Cascades line should be central to the adding on of a UHSR system with limited stops. Extensive information about Amtrak Cascades needs to be included in all updates regarding UHSR. Amtrak Cascades could have double the capacity within 10 years if WSDOT would commit to building out the high growth Scenario in the 2019 Washington State rail plan. The public and the legislature need to know what WSDOT is planning for Amtrak Cascades and how that interacts with the UHSR project. WSDOT’s plans for Amtrak Cascades remain shrouded in mystery and lack of funding requests.
- Justification for UHSGT is to be competitive with air travel, but the report does not call out that Amtrak Cascades is already competitive with air travel (pg 31) and has potential to be much more so, i.e. let’s challenge the premise that a 1-hour trip between Seattle-Portland and Seattle-Vancouver is required.
- The report should include discussion of Climate goals set out by WSDOT including reduction of GHG and VMT. The report should be centered on interaction with regional rail and transit networks to have a specific focus on reduction of VMT. As written, it looks like there is no focus on reduced VMT – just driving to the one UHSGT station in the Seattle area.
- All the positive aspirations of UHSR can be more quickly and efficiently obtained through investments in upgrading the existing rail service, e.g., address unpredictable travel times, provide construction and operations jobs, stimulate business development and investment in communities served by rail, provide equitable and green transportation. Given the extremely high cost of UHSR, alternatives to this project should be included in the report, especially what the High Growth Scenario for Amtrak Cascades can deliver with a much more certain timeline and cost estimate.
- All the values depicted by the “North Star” description on page 4 of WSDOT’s Project Report can be met more quickly, more effectively, and for lower cost, by focusing on improvements to our existing Amtrak Cascades service, concurrently with critical integration with I-5 highway projects and multimodal program planning across all jurisdictions. These shared values and priority outcomes include: a) connecting the region, b) advancing racial and social equity, c) growing the economy, d) reducing emissions and building resilience, e) using resources efficiently, and f) bringing partners and people together.
The UHSR program is unlikely to provide any of these outcomes within a relevant timeframe. It is a distraction from the urgency to move toward these outcomes. Proper strategic planning should identify the best direction toward realizing these core tenets. UHSR is not the best direction for this region at this time. Efforts should focus on updating the Long Range Plan for Amtrak Cascades (2006), completing a new Cascades Service Development Plan based upon a high ridership scenario, and completing it in a timely way to receive federal funds for implementation. Planning should aim for completion of projects incrementally within a decade while service is operational, giving the maximum number of people the opportunity to use rail and transit options in preference to driving.
- WSDOT and UHSGT promoters have been funding and planning this project for about six years, have spent over $2.5 million, and have produced nothing of substance. There needs to be more accuracy and transparency when making claims about the speed of travel, the timeline, the route, the communities it’s connecting, and the cost of the project when informing the public and the Legislature. For example, speeds for HSR cannot exceed 220 mph; 250 mph is a testing speed for Tier III trains. Washington is spending public money – over $100 million in state climate funds and multimodal funds – for this project that has no clear parameters. We would be better served to invest in rail that has near-term benefits.
The Legislature has earmarked a substantial amount of Climate Commitment Act funds to the Ultra High Speed Ground Transportation program. The foregoing has demonstrated that the use of Climate Commitment Act funds for this program is inappropriate.
TAW